We present a framework for reasoning about secrecy in a class of Diffie-Hellman protocols. The technique, which shares a conceptual origin with the idea of a rank function, uses the notion of a messagetemplate to determine whether a given value is generable by an intruder in a protocol model. Traditionally, the rich algebraic structure of Diffie-Hellman messages has made it difficult to reason about such protocols using formal, rather than complexity-theoretic, techniques. We describe the approach in the context of the MTI protocols, and derive conditions under which each protocol in the suite can be considered secure. 1
Introduction
Formal protocol analysis techniques have a simplicity which is due, in part, to the high level of abstraction at which they operate. Such abstractions are justified since any attack discovered at the abstract level will tend to be preserved in a more concrete model. In general, however, failure to discover an attack does not imply correctness, and in seeking to establish correctness we must be mindful of the assumptions on which our abstractions are based.
Protocols based on the Diffie-Hellman scheme present an interesting verification challenge since, in this context, we cannot assume such an abstract view of cryptography. Certain algebraic properties [such as the com-mutativity of exponentiation in (g x ) y = (g y ) x ] must be represented for the protocol to reach its functional goal, and other properties (such as the cancellation of multiplicative inverses) must also be considered if we wish to prove a meaningful security result. As a consequence, such protocols have tended to be evaluated in complexity-theoretic models (see [5] , for example) which aim to reduce the correctness of the protocol to some welldefined hard problem, such as the computation of discrete logarithms in a finite field. The resulting proofs tend to be difficult to conduct and evaluate, and a small change in the protocol will often require an entirely new proof to be constructed.
With some exceptions [16, 19, 18, 1] formal techniques have been slow in rising to the challenge of DiffieHellman. This paper presents a theorem-proving approach to the verification of a class of Diffie-Hellman protocols. Although our approach is quite general we present it in the context of the MTI protocols of Matsumoto et al. [15] . These protocols are chosen for the simplicity of their messages and non-standard use of Diffie-Hellman [in particular, the computation of a shared key as g x · g y = g x+y in MTI A(0)]. The design of the MTI protocols is such that we are able to model them at a very abstract level. The MTI class A protocols are described in Sect. 2. Our model revolves around the idea of a message-template which, suitably instantiated, can represent any value that an attacker can deduce (under a defined set of capabilities). A particular value remains secret if it cannot be realised via any instantiation of the message-template. This model, and its associated definition of secrecy, is described in Sect. 3 and applied to the MTI A(0) protocol in Sect. 4 . Section 5 then extends the technique to the remaining protocols in the suite. Although we do not describe it in such language, our approach shares a conceptual origin with the notion of a rank function, and is informed by the approach of Pereira and Quisquater; we explore these relationships, and conclude, in Sect. 6.
The MTI protocols
Three infinite classes of authenticated key agreement protocols fall under the banner of MTI [15] . All of the MTI protocols are amenable to analysis in our framework but, in the first instance, we focus on one particular protocol, A(0). The protocol combines long-term and ephemeral key contributions to provide authentication in the Diffie-Hellman scheme. A summary of notation, following [4] , is given in Table 1 . In protocol A(0) ( The protocol aims to convince each principal that no one, aside from the other protocol participant, can learn the shared-secret Z AB . This property is often termed implicit key authentication: Definition 2.1 Let P be a 2-party key agreement protocol involving principals A and B, and let k be a secret jointly generated as a result of P. We say that P provides implicit key authentication if A and B are assured that no principal C / ∈ {A, B} can learn k (unless aided by a dishonest D ∈ {A, B}). AB The shared secret between A and B x ∈ R X An element x chosen at random from the set X
Fig. 1 MTI A(0) protocol
In line with previous work [19, 8] we formalise implicit key authentication as the inability of an attacker to learn a shared secret. All of the MTI protocols involve the exchange of two messages, z A and z B , each of which is computed within the principal and not as a function of a previously received message. (Contrast this with protocols like Cliques [3] , where a principal B may receive an input m from A, apply some function to m and send the result on to C.) We will see in the next section that this fact enables us to model protocols at a very abstract level.
A model for Diffie-Hellman protocols
In this section we present a model for Diffie-Hellman protocols based around the idea of a message-template which defines the general form of any message generable by an attacker in a given protocol.
We begin by noting that transmitted messages are elements of some group G in which the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is believed to be hard. A generator g of G is agreed by all principals and there exists an identity element 1 such that 1 · x = 1, for all x ∈ G. We assume that elements of G can be expressed as g raised to the power of a sum of products of random numbers. This assumption permits, for example, g xy+z , where x, y and z are random integers, but excludes values such as g (g x ) since the exponent is itself a group element. The users of the system therefore manipulate two types of element, (i) random exponents, and (ii) powers of g, and we assume that only the latter will be sent on the network: Assumption 3.1 All values passing on the network are powers of g where the exponent can be expressed as a sum of products of random integers, and computation takes place in a group in which the Decisional DiffieHellman problem is hard. Furthermore, we assume that g cannot appear in the exponent of the value.
In the protocol, principals make use of public-key certificates, such as g x A , but we do not specify how such certificates are registered and obtained. Instead, we assume the following: Assumption 3.2 There exists a certification authority, or some other means by which a principal A can obtain B's public-key certificate and be sure that B (and only B) knows the corresponding private-key.
Finally, we divide the principals into disjoint sets of honest and dishonest agents, such that: Assumption 3.3 Honest principals do not deviate from the protocol and do not (knowingly) divulge their secret keys or any previously established session-keys.
In fact, we assume the presence of a single dishonest principal: the attacker.
The attacker
We divide the users of the system into a set of honest principals, {A, B}, who will always adhere to the protocol, and a malevolent agent, C, whose goal is to subvert the protocol.
Some elements of (i) and (ii) (from Sect. 3) will be known initially to the attacker (such as random numbers he has chosen himself, and their corresponding powers), and some elements of (ii) will become known to the attacker during the course of the protocol. The design of the protocols means that an active attacker cannot influence any of the values sent by honest participants, since the functions which produce these values are not dependent on any external input. 2 This is important, since it is then sufficient to assume that the attacker knows these values from the start.
Following [19] , we divide the attacker's initial knowledge into a set E of exponents, and a set P of exponents where the corresponding powers of g are known and x ∈ P indicates knowledge of g x but not of x (unless x ∈ E). We then define the computations that the attacker can perform: Definition 3.1 (attacker capabilities) Given a set P of exponents of initially known powers of g and a set E of initially known exponents, the attacker can grow P based on the following operations:
1. given m 1 ∈ P and m 2 ∈ P add m 1 + m 2 to P 2. given m ∈ P and n ∈ E add mn, m(n −1 ) to P 3. given m ∈ P add −m to P.
In other words, we allow the attacker to (1) compute g m 1 · g m 2 = g m 1 +m 2 given knowledge of g m 1 and g m 2 , (2) compute the exponentiations (g m ) n , (g m ) n −1 given knowledge of g m and n, and (3) compute the inverse 1 g m = g −m given g m . Moreover, these capabilities can be combined:
Example 1 Suppose that P = {1, r A } and E = {r C }. The attacker can deduce (i) −r A ∈ P by rule 3 from r A , (ii) 1r C ∈ P by rule 2 and −r A + 1r C ∈ P by rule 1 from (i) and (ii), representing the computation of g r C −r A .
Crucially, the attacker is not able to use m 1 ∈ P and m 2 ∈ P to deduce m 1 m 2 .
In this model, the attacker's entire knowledge can be defined as the closure of P under the deductions of Definition 3.1 and set E. In any useful protocol, E and P will initially be non-empty, and the resulting knowledge sets will be infinite. For this reason, it will be infeasible to enumerate these sets by growing P via successive application of rules 1-3.
System definition
An examination of the sorts of values that can be deduced by an attacker leads to the following observation: a generable value can be written as some number of elements of P multiplied by some product of (possibly inverted) elements from E. For instance, the value derived in Example 1 can be written as −1(r A )(r 0 C ) + 1(1)(r 1 C ) (noting the difference between the group identity 1 and the integer 1). In fact, we can go further by defining a polynomial over the variables of E and P which represents any value generable by the attacker using rules 1-3, above. Definition 3.2 Let F be a finite family of functions that map elements of E to integer powers: F ⊆ fin E → Z.
Given E ={x C }, for example, we may define F = {{x C → −1}}.
Definition 3.3
Let h be a higher-order function which, for a member of F, maps elements of P to integers: h : F → (P → Z).
As an example, given P = {r A } and F = {{x C → −1}}, we might choose to define h({x C → −1}) = {r A → 1}.
Definition 3.4 (message-template)
Fix some E and P. Then:
We call v the message-template for a system defined by E and P. Intuition is little help here, so consider a simple example:
Example 2 Given the system defined by P = {r A } and E = {x C }, consider how the value g −r A x −1 C +5r A x C can be expressed. Our goal is to find F and h such that:
We begin by rewriting the right-hand side of the equation to include all multipliers of P elements and powers of E elements:
The term is a linear combination of two components, each of which makes reference to a different power of x C (−1 and 1). This guides us to a definition of F, as:
In the first component of the linear combination, the −1st power of x C is multiplied by −1 · r A , leading us to:
In the second component, the 1st power of x C is multiplied by 5 · r A , leading to:
and h is defined such that h({x C → −1}) = {r A → 1} and h({x C → 1}) = {r A → 5}.
As a more complex example, consider the following:
Taking a different approach this time, consider how the value g r C −r A (from Example 1) can be represented. We are looking for F and h such that:
Note that, on the left-hand side of the equation, each component is in terms of the product of some powers of x C and r C . Since x C does not appear in the target value r C − r A , this leads us to:
This, in turn leads us to a definition of F:
We also note that r B ∈ P does not appear in r C − r A . Expanding the right-hand side in terms of P we get:
Finally, the coefficients of each P term in the above lead us to define h such that:
Note that, in the definition of the message-template, h is defined in terms of F. Therefore, any values v(F 1 , h 1 ) and v(F 2 , h 2 ) exhibit the following property:
, we have that:
As stated, our intention is that, for a given system (defined by E and P), the polynomial v(F, h) expresses the general form of all values deducible by an attacker, from P and E, by appeal to the deduction rules of Definition 3.1. We embed the ability of a polynomial to take a certain value in the concept of realisability:
Definition 3.6 A value m is realisable (which we write as realisable(m)) if there exists functions F and h such that v(F, h) = m.

That is, a value m is realisable if there exists a solution to the equation v(F, h)
If m is not realisable we write ¬realisable(m). Define Pub to be a closure containing all possible polynomials for a given system. Pub is the set containing all realisable values of that system: the set of public messages. The use of Pub is slightly misleading, since it will tend to contain private data belonging to the attacker. However, since we assume that the attacker is the only malevolent principal, it behoves us to take an attacker-centric view of public knowledge in the system. The set Pub contains everything that is not private to the honest principals.
Theorem 3.7 (faithfulness) Fix some P and E and Pub as defined above. Pub is closed under the deductions of Definition 3.1.
Proof By induction. For the base case we show that, whenever p ∈ P, p is realisable. Base case: Given some p ∈ P, p is realisable with v(F, h) by defining:
and:
Inductive step: There are three cases, corresponding to the three attacker deduction rules: 2 and h such that:
(ii) For the first conjunct assume m 1 = v(F 1 , h 1 ) and n ∈ E. Then m 1 n is realisable with v(F 2 , h 2 ) by defining:
and h 2 such that:
The second conjunct follows the above, with addition in place of the subtraction in the definition of h 2 .
(iii) Assume
where h 2 is defined such that:
Our intention is for the model to respect the fact that some values are only possible for an attacker to derive by a lucky guess (with negligible probability). The following example makes this clear:
Example 4 Consider the system defined by P = {1, x A } and E = {x C }. Any group value g x A can be realised
In this example, the attacker should not be able to derive x A (since he only knows g x A ), but it seems that he can derive it via a judicious choice of X. Using this tactic the attacker can potentially derive any group member, and no session-key can ever remain secret. In practice, however, such lucky guesses are not possible, and we require that our abstraction respects this fact. This is a thorny issue since it invites us to impose an unnatural separation between 'numbers' (such as X in the above example), and 'symbolic terms' (such as x C ) by stating that numbers and symbols are disjoint. Clearly this separation is unreasonable since both X and x C are numbers.
Instead we say that, for a system, an interpretation of that system is the assignment of concrete values to the terms x A , x C , etc. We then limit the attacker by stating that a value is only realisable if the realisation is independent of the interpretation. In particular, the value x A is not realisable here since it depends on the interpretation of x A as X. By extension, any 'attack' on a protocol in our abstraction must be independent of the interpretation of terms within the model of that protocol.
Note that an element n ∈ E \ P will typically only be realisable if 1 ∈ P. That is, n is realisable by v(F, h), where F = {{n → 1}} and h({n
We require that the above condition be true of any protocol model. To see why this is necessary consider the system given by E = {x C }, P = {1, x C }. The value x C can be realised in two ways,
, where:
and h 1 , h 2 are defined such that:
, the example allows the same value to be derived in two separate ways.
Even in the context of Condition 3.8, the (desirable) property of unique realisability-that a value can be realised in at most one way-is not generally true. Consider the following counter-example:
Example 5 Let E = {x C }, P = {x A } and note that E and P satisfy Condition 3.8. The value x A x C can be realised in at least two ways:
(i) Define v(F 1 , h 1 ) where:
where:
In this example, the property of unique realisability is violated by the presence, in the linear combinations, of components equalling 0; in (i) we have 0x A x 0 C = 0 and, in (ii), 0x A x 2 C . We introduce a normalisation procedure which removes such degenerate components.
This would yield, for example, norm(v (F 1 , h 1 
there appear to be two cases to consider, F 1 = F 2 and h 1 = h 2 . However, from Lemma 3.5 we have that F 1 = F 2 ⇒ h 1 = h 2 , so it will be sufficient to treat the case
In this case, h 1 = h 2 tells us that (a) there exists some
In this first case there exists some coefficient of the linear combination of v(F 1 , h 1 ) which does not appear in the linear combination of v(F 2 , h 2 ). It is not possible (in all interpretations of the system) for any combination of components from v(F 2 , h 2 ) to equal (and, therefore, cancel with) the presence of f in v(F 1 , h 1 ). Therefore, the equality v(
, there are no values of the coefficients of v(F 2 , h 2 ) which will allow the equality to be met in all interpretations, yielding a contradiction which establishes the theorem.
Secrecy
In a Diffie-Hellman protocol, a principal u performs some key computation function on an input z to derive a secret Z uv believed to be shared with v. We denote this function k uv with Z uv = k uv (z).
Example 6
In the standard Diffie-Hellman protocol [11] , a principal A, apparently running with B and using the secret x A performs the key computation k AB (z) = zx A representing the shared secret Z AB = g zx A .
Definition 3.11 (Secrecy) Given a system defined by E and P, a key computation function k maintains secrecy iff:
Intuitively, secrecy is defined as an anti-closure property of the set of generable values: the result of applying k to a realisable value should never result in a realisable value. If this property does not hold then an attacker will possess two values, x and y, such that, if x is sent to some principal she will compute y, wrongly believing it to be secret.
Reasoning about the MTI A(0) protocol
A complete model of a protocol is a combination of the message-template with an appropriate key computation function. In this section we present a model of the MTI A(0) protocol and use it to deduce the conditions under which the protocol guarantees the secrecy of a shared key.
Define 
We treat each in turn. AC (z) = zx A + x C r A is a linear combination, and that the linear combination will be realisable if each of its components is realisable. In general zx A will be realisable if z does not mention x A (since x A ∈ P but x A / ∈ E). Consider, then, z = r C , given by v(F 1 , h 1 ) where: realisable by v(F 3 , h 4 ) , where:
Theorem 3.7 then tells us that, since realisable(r C x A ) and realisable(x C r A ), the sum r C x A + x C r A is also realisable, and is given by v(F 2 , h 2 ), where: 
As a result, the attacker can deduce a pair of values −r A and 0 such that 0 = k
AA (−r A ) and, again, secrecy fails. A similar result holds for case 6, where a = b = B. This attack is a simpler version of one discovered by Just and Vaudenay [13] . In the original attack, z was set to be r C − r A and the resulting session-key computed as g x A r C (where x A r C is realisable). The attack depends on A's willingness to engage in the protocol with herself, and can be seen as stipulating a condition on an implementation: namely, that a principal should only engage in the protocol if the other party has a distinct identity. 
Consider the coefficient of x 0 C r 0 C . We have:
for some m 1 , . . . , m 5 ∈ Z, n 1 , . . . , n 5 ∈ Z where the coefficients on both sides are the same:
Since x B r A is distinct from all other terms on either side of the equation, there are no values of the coefficients which enable the equality to be met in all interpretations of the terms. We conclude that, for any realisable z, k
Results
The analysis enables us to state the following result:
Theorem 4.1 For protocol MTI A(0), given E A(0)
ab maintains secrecy This tells us that protocol A(0) maintains the secrecy of the session-key precisely when the initiator and responder are distinct entities and neither of them is the attacker C.
Further examples: A(i), B(i) and C(i)
In the previous section we saw how message-templates can be used to reason about the MTI A(0) protocol. 
Fig. 2 MTI A(i) protocol
Fig. 3 MTI B(i) protocol
In fact, A(0) is just one of an infinite number of protocols that fall under the banner of MTI. In this section we investigate these protocols and describe their corresponding security analyses. In particular, we note in passing that the correctness conditions for A(0) appear to apply equally well in the general case A(i). In the following, we concentrate instead on the remaining MTI protocol classes: B(i) and C(i).
General form of the MTI protocols
All MTI protocols are of the same basic form, involving the exchange of two messages, and aiming to provide implicit authentication of the resulting shared secret. The three classes of MTI protocols: A, B and C, differ in the precise format of the exchanged messages and the computation which each principal performs to derive the shared secret. The general form for each class is given in terms of a parameter i ∈ Z where, for instance, B(i) is the ith protocol of class B. For comparison, Table 2 summarises the exponent of the shared secret derived in each protocol. 3 Protocols A(i), B(i) and C(i) are given in Figs. 2, 3 and 4, respectively. 3 Reproduced from [4] .
Fig. 4 MTI C(i) protocol
Note that the format of exchanged messages does not differ between the B(i) and C(i) protocols; instead, the distinction lies in the computation performed to derive the shared secret in each case.
It is also interesting to note that the A(i) protocols are rather different in nature to the B(i)/C(i) protocols. In the A(i) protocols, any message M = g are independent of the principal with whom A wishes to establish a shared secret since A only adds her own exponents (r A and x A ) to the received value z B . Whilst this difference does not appear to have security implications, it does affect the way in which we represent the protocols in our model.
Message-templates for B(i) and C(i)
We use the message-template of Definition 3.4, where we define the set E (of known exponents) as:
where x C is the attacker C's long-term secret-key and r C is some random exponent generated by C. Note that the set E B is independent of the protocol parameter, i. For each i ∈ Z, we define the set P B (i) (of known powers of g) as follows: 
This definition of P B allows the attacker to learn a larger set of values than is typically assumed since it allows for the reuse of the random exponents. For instance,
P B (i) includes the values x B r A x i
A and x C r A x i A which respectively represent a run between A and B and a run between A and C; the session variable, r A , is used in both cases. However, proving correctness in this context will enable us to conclude correctness in a more restricted context where r A is used just once.
Reasoning about B(i)
Given an input z, a principal a in protocol B(i) computes the shared secret with exponent zx −1 a + r a x i a . As noted above, a's key computation is independent of the identity of the other protocol participant. The resulting key computation function is therefore:
We wish to prove that, for any i ∈ Z, k B(i) a maintains secrecy. The case a = C (representing the attacker's key computation function) is redundant since C can achieve the same result using his deduction rules on the values x C , r C . We therefore restrict ourselves to the following goal:
maintains secrecy
A first restriction
We begin by noting that, as with protocol A(0), we cannot expect the shared secret to be unknown to C if either A or B actually choose to run the protocol with C. In such a run A and B will generate and send the values x C r A x i A ∈ P B (i) and x C r B x i B ∈ P B (i), respectively, and k
B(i) a
will not maintain secrecy. We therefore consider the restricted set:
A second restriction
We fix some arbitrary i ∈ Z and consider the case a = A, noting that analogous results hold for a = B. For secrecy to fail there must exist some z = v(F 1 , h 1 ) and k
Consider the coefficient of x p C r q C , where p and q are arbitrary integers: As with A(0), this attack suggests that any implementation should ensure that the protocol participants are distinct. However, it is worth considering whether this is strictly necessary. The impersonation attack on A(0) allows the attacker to force the shared secret to be computed as one of a number of values. Here, the attack only appears to work when the resulting exponent is 0 (i.e., the attacker cannot inject his own value into the shared secret). We formalise this in the property of nondegenerate-key secrecy: Definition 5.1 (non-degenerate-key secrecy) Given a system defined by E and P, a key computation function k maintains non-degenerate-key secrecy iff:
non-degenerate-key secrecy is weaker than the secrecy property of Definition 3.11 since it disregards cases where the exponent of the shared secret is computed as 0. Note that this definition does not prevent the exponent of values passing on the network from being 0.
Results
Restricting the output of k B(i)
A to non-zero values translates to a constraint on the coefficients of v(F 2 , h 2 ): that at least one has to be initialised to a non-zero value. Under this constraint, it can be shown that the key computation function k B(i) a maintains non-degenerate-key secrecy, given E B and P B :
Theorem 5.2 For protocol MTI B(i), given E
maintains non-degenerate-key secrecy. Proof We fix some arbitrary i ∈ Z and consider the case a = A, (an analogous result holds for a = B). If nondegenerate secrecy fails there must exist z = v(F 1 , h 1 ) and k
The constraint that the resulting secret be non-zero means that there must exist at least one non-zero coefficient in v(F 2 , h 2 ). Let p ∈ Z, q ∈ Z be the powers of x C and r C (respectively) in v(F 2 , h 2 ) in which a non-zero coefficient occurs. Consider the coefficient of x p C r q C , where p and q are arbitrary integers: for some m 1 , . . . , m 7 ∈ Z, n 1 , . . . , n 7 ∈ Z where the coefficients on both sides are the same:
One of n 1 , . . . , n 7 must be non-zero; let this coefficient be n r . There is no value of the coefficient n r which can enable the equality to be met. For example, if n r = n 4 , then the component n r r A x i+1 A is distinct from all terms on either side of the equation.
As a result, we conclude that, for any i ∈ Z, k
a (z) = 0), and the theorem holds.
Reasoning about C(i)
The C(i) protocols involve the same exchange of messages as the class B protocols; the difference lies in the key computation. In an ideal run of C(i), each principal computes the key:
In our model, a principal a, on receipt of an input z, will perform the following key computation:
Following the approach that we used for B(i), we consider whether there exist realisable values, v(F 1 , h 1 ) (whose coefficients are represented by subscripted m values) and v(F 2 , h 2 ) (represented by subscripted n values), such that:
To exclude cases where honest principals willingly engage with the attacker, we define the P set as per the first restriction in the B(i) analysis, above. Specifically, we have that:
We also define E C = E B = {x C , r C }. As before, we fix a = A and consider the coefficients of x p C r q C , for arbitrary integers p and q. For secrecy to fail, the following equality must hold: In contrast to the A(i) and B(i) protocols, the left-hand side of the above equation does not contain any component that is not multiplied by an m coefficient. This arises from the difference in key computation between A(i)/B(i) and C(i). In the former cases, the key computation relies on the multiplication of two elements of G, and results in the presence of addition in the exponent of the shared secret (g x · g y = g x+y ). In the latter case, the key is computed by exponentiating the received value, and the exponent of the shared secret is therefore a simple product ((g x ) y = g xy ). For this reason, the above equation can be solved, very simply, by setting all coefficients to 0, resulting in 0 = 0. This solution corresponds to a well-known attack on standard Diffie-Hellman, where the attacker simply replaces the exchanged values, z A and z B , with g 0 = 1. The principals then compute the shared secret:
which is realisable by the attacker. This attack can be prevented in a straightforward manner; each principal must check incoming messages and reject those which have the degenerate value g 0 = 1. This translates to a constraint on the coefficients of v(F 1 , h 2 ): that at least one has to be initialised to a non-zero value. We formalise this property in the concept of non-degenerate-input secrecy: Definition 5.3 (non-degenerate-input secrecy) Given a system defined by E and P, a key computation function k maintains non-degenerate-input secrecy iff:
Note the difference between the three definitions of secrecy that we have introduced in this paper-the first (secrecy) is unconstrained; the second (non-degeneratekey secrecy) looks at cases where the exponent of the value output by the key computation function is nonzero; the third (non-degenerate-input-secrecy) looks at cases where the exponent of the value input to the key computation function is non-zero.
Results
It can be shown that the key computation function k C(i) a
maintains non-degenerate-input secrecy, given E C and P C : 
Specifically, we fix some arbitrary i ∈ Z, a = A, and consider the coefficients of x p C r q C for arbitrary integers p and q. For secrecy to fail, the following equality must hold: In the case of non-degenerate-input secrecy, we only consider cases where one of the m coefficients has a non-zero value. Since each component of the linear combination is distinct from all others (on either side of the equation), there can be no values of the coefficients which cause the equality to hold in all interpretations. We can therefore conclude that the theorem holds.
Discussion
Summary of results
The three classes of MTI protocols are conceptually similar, yet the security results yielded by our model are subtly different in each case:
The model of the A(i) protocol maintains the secrecy of the shared secret if the run involves distinct, and honest, protocol participants. If a principal is willing to run the protocol with herself an attacker can manipulate that run to learn the (possibly non-degenerate) session-keys.
B(i)
The B(i) protocol maintains the secrecy of the shared secret if the run involves honest protocol participants, and each rejects any shared secrets computed as 1 (i.e., when the exponent of the shared secret is 0). Note, in particular, that this does not preclude situations where a principal runs the protocol with herself.
C(i)
The C(i) protocol maintains the secrecy of the shared secret if the run involves honest protocol participants and each rejects incoming values of 1 (i.e., g 0 ). If a principal is willing to accept 1 as an input to the key computation function she will compute a shared secret (Z AB = 1) which is known to the attacker.
It is important to note that these results hold for a single run of the corresponding protocol. In particular, we have not considered whether the results extend to networks that allow an arbitrary number of (possibly concurrent) runs. We suspect, however, that such an argument could be constructed with the aid of a non-interference-type result. We have also not considered whether the security results hold in a network where different protocols from the suite can be executed. It is possible that, in such a network, messages intercepted in a run of one protocol might be profitably injected into a run of another protocol.
The link with rank functions
Although we have not described our approach in such terms, it shares a conceptual origin with the notion of a rank function. In the context of protocol verification, a rank function describes an invariant property of a system [20] . This property will define the sorts of messages that may pass through the system, crucially distinguishing certain values that should remain secret. The rank function effectively partitions the message-space of a protocol by assigning a rank of pub to public and sec to secret messages. Traditionally a rank function is defined over the message-space of a protocol model expressed in the process algebra CSP [21] , and a central rank theorem gives a series of proof obligations on the rank function whose achievement allows us to conclude that only messages of rank pub ever appear on the network. Previous work has applied the rank function approach in the context of Diffie-Hellman protocols [10] . However, a fundamental difficulty with this approach is the necessity to statically assign a rank to messages. It is interesting to note that the present work side-steps this issue by defining (via the message-template) the set Pub of public messages. This set corresponds to the set of messages assigned a rank of pub by the rank approach. 4 One could extend the analogy by defining the set Sec, of secret messages, as the range of a given key computation function (whose input is restricted to values in Pub). The set Sec would then correspond to the set of messages assigned a rank of sec by a rank function. In this view secrecy is maintained if the sets Pub and Sec contain no common elements.
Pereira and Quisquater's approach
Previously, Pereira and Quisquater [19] developed a formal model of the Cliques conference key agreement protocols [3] , based on linear logic, and discovered attacks on each of the claimed security properties. In the model, secrecy is defined as the inability of an attacker to discover a pair of values (g x , g y ) such that, if a principal is sent g x , he will compute the key g y . Values are assumed to take the form of g raised to a product of exponents, and secrecy becomes the inability of an attacker to learn a pair of messages separated by the ratio y x . The model allows the attacker to grow a set of known ratios, in the hope that some secret ratio(s) remain unobtainable. This ratio-centric view of secrecy seems particularly natural for Diffie-Hellman exchanges, and our initial attempts at modelling the MTI protocols sought to embrace this approach. However, it turns out that this view of secrecy does not generalise in the obvious way. Consider, for example, a value z in the A(0) protocol, and the key computation function k
is still in terms of z, due to the presence of addition in the exponents. This fact makes it difficult to derive the set of secret ratios, since a ratio cannot be stated without recourse to the argument to the key computation function. The present work can be viewed as an attempt to provide a more general view of Diffie-Hellman key computation.
In a different respect, Pereira's and Quisquater's model is more general than ours, since it applies to protocols which provides services, in which protocol participants receive a message, perform some computation on that message and send out the result. These services are encoded in terms of the values added to the exponent of an incoming message. For instance, a principal may receive a message g x and generate and send the message g xyz (where y and z are known to that principal). The attacker can then (with some restrictions) use the principal as an oracle, enabling him to send a spurious message g c and receive g cyz in return. One could envisage weakening the assumptions of the current work by internalising such services in the attacker (in the style of Broadfoot and Roscoe [6] ) where, for example, the multiplication of a value with yz is encoded as an additional attacker deduction. The message-template would need to be redesigned to account for these additional capabilities. In contrast to the present work, such a message-template would tend to be protocol specific.
Assumptions and attacks
In light of the above, some care is needed in establishing the assumptions upon which our proofs of the MTI protocols are based.
Consider the three assumptions of Sect. 3. These assumptions are necessary, since attacks exist when one or more of them are relaxed. For example, Menezes et al. [17] discovered an unknown key-share attack on all classes of the MTI protocols under the assumption that an attacker can register a public-key y C which is related to A's public-key by the equation y C = y x C A = g x A x C . However, C does not know the corresponding secret key (in violation of Assumption 3.2). 5 As another example, Lim and Lee devised attacks which apply to MTI variants [14] . These attacks depend on the attacker sending a value to an honest principal B which is not in the group G, and so violates the Assumption 3.1. Lastly, Burmester proposed an attack which requires the attacker, C, to run the protocol with both A and B and later induce A and B to reveal the keys used in sessions between them [7] . This violates Assumption 3.3.
These attacks are computational in flavour, and it is not clear whether a symbolic approach should seek to reason about such attacks. It is clear, however, that care should be taken-when claiming a proof of correctness-to state the assumptions on which that proof is founded.
Conclusion and further work
We have presented a framework for reasoning about secrecy in a class of Diffie-Hellman protocols, and dem-onstrated the approach by a consideration of secrecy in the MTI protocols. The work hinges around the idea of a message-template, a term which defines, in a highly abstract way, the values that can be deduced by an attacker under a given set of capabilities. A protocol model is given as a combination of a message-template and a function representing the key computation applied by a principal to derive a shared secret.
This work is nascent, but we are currently applying it to protocols beyond the MTI suite. In particular, we have used the approach to reason about two further key agreement protocols: one proposed independently by Just and Vaudenay [13] and Song and Kim [22] , and another due to Ateniese et al. [3] ; in both cases we can apply our approach without modification. Other protocols, however, may prompt us to extend the approach. The key establishment protocol of Agnew et al. [2] , makes use of messages of the form g x · y, where y is an integer (and not a group element). This is inexpressible in our current model where we are limited to messages expressible as g raised to the power of a sum of products of integers. Relaxing the restrictions on our algebra to allow the expression of such messages seems particularly interesting. The consideration of further protocols (such as Cliques) may require us to address situations in which protocol participants provide services. In many cases, this extension appears straightforward.
The ad hoc nature of the secrecy proof in Sect. 4 is unfortunate, and it would be useful to derive a general framework for such proof (as is achieved in [19] , for instance). There also appears to be interesting links between the idea of a message-template and the concept of ideal used within the strand space approach [23] . Future work will investigate whether this correspondence enables us to deduce general principles with which a protocol can be proven correct.
There is a more general discussion to be had on the role of symbolic modelling approaches to protocols based on the Diffie-Hellman scheme. For instance, it could be argued that the algebraic framework described here is incompletely specified. As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, the assumption that values are "powers of g where the exponent can be expressed as a sum of products of random integers" is rather awkward. We intended, with the work presented here, to keep our reasoning entirely within the Dolev-Yao framework: this has proven difficult, and has prompted us to make some awkward assumptions. It should be a primary goal of future work to explore, in particular, the necessity and soundness of these assumptions and, more generally, the boundary between these symbolic and analytical proof techniques. It is a non-trivial task, to be sure, but also of critical importance.
